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John Dewey's Theory of Experience and Learning 
Joop W. A. Berding 
Introduction 
In the history of curriculum we see lines of divergence 
into two separate schools. On the one hand, we can find a 
view that emphasizes the school-based distribution of selected 
knowledge. 'Education' is conceptualized as intervention, (i.e. 
the transmission of a bulk of tradition-given, indisputable 
knowledge), in which the experiences of the learner (inside 
or outside the school) only count in relation to externally 
defined objectives. The success of education is primarily 
measured in terms of 'qualification,' that is meeting up to 
predetermined, 'objective' standards. We might call this a 
technological, product-oriented outlook on education and 
curriculum. Its keywords are transmission and control. 
On the other hand there is a tradition in which the pupil/ 
learner is in the center of the educational process. 'Educa-
tion' is conceptualized as Bildung, which includes the articu-
lation of needs and interests as part of the individual's 
personality or identity. Education is seen as process; the 
standard of its success cannot be determined a priori, nor 
outside of the personhood of the learner. We might call this 
the Bildung or process-oriented outlook on education and 
curriculum. Its key words are freedom and self-education. 
If we summarize these positions from different angles 
we get the next overview shown on the table below: 
In what I call the technological approach some traits from 
the teacher or subject-centered tradition can be recognized 
and in what I have named Bildung some traits from the child-
centered tradition can be discerned. 
Looking at contemporary educational theory, of which 
curriculum theory is an essential part, one can see that the 
first school has become the dominant one, as a sort of 
'standard-view' of curriculum. Summarized, its main features 
include: 
1. a conglomeration of atomistic, cognitivistic, de-
socialized, de-personalized and de-contextualized 
'fillings', mostly defined as 'subject matter' or 
studies; 
2. a catalogue or canon, that is an autonomous, almost 
unpersonal entity, isolated from and a priori to the 
(social) experiences of the learners; 
3. the primacy of educational objectives; 
4. the idea that curriculum embodies 'transferable' 
culture; 
5. the general idea that learning is produced by formal-
ized didactical input. 
This type of thinking on curriculum has found its best 
formulation in the so-called Tyler 'Rationale' (Tyler, 1949). 
In this type of thinking, curriculum development follows a 
technological approach Bildung-approach 
method transmission of knowledge by means of 
external control 
self-education and growth 
status of knowledge autonomous objective traditions 
(selections) 
result of social-cultural co-construction 
status of experience in service of external objectives starting point of activities 
means and ends separated connected 
position of teacher representative facilitator 
institute school internal communication; monopoly on 
knowledge 
part of larger educative 'field' 
curriculum 'Festlegungstext'; instrument of 
transmission and control 
flexible and sensitive toward personal 
experiences of learners 
Education and Culture Spring, 1997 Vol. XIV No. 1 
TOWARDS A FLEXIBLE CURRICULUM 2 5 
prescribed path on the basis of what Tyler calls 'four funda-
mental questions' (1949, 2), the first and most fundamental 
being that of the educational goals to be achieved. As Kliebard 
(1975) has shown, this 'model' of curriculum has in the past 
served in the process of the bureaucratization and 
methodization of education (for a critique of this perspective 
see Hlebowitsh, 1996). Along side this we find that the com-
municative process is conceptualized as an unproblematic 
sender-receiver affair, in which as Garrison (1995, 727) says 
". . . psychic entities (e.g. ideas, schemata, and scripts) are 
conducted from one talking head to another by means of 
physical symbols and sounds." In this uni-directional affair, 
the receiver is conceptualized as passive.^ 'Education' has 
indeed become equated, in the mind of the general public 
anyway (if not in that of many educationalists) with a 
curriculum that support the model smooth transmission of a 
specified selection of what Michael Apple calls 'official 
knowledge.' Questions such as 'why?' and 'what for?' 
become superseded by questions of 'how?' (Berding, forth-
coming). Tanner and Tanner (1988), however, claim the Tyler 
rationale to be the 'paradigm' for the curriculum field. They 
state: 
In essence, Tyler's syllabus proved to be an orchestration and 
systematic elaboration of the key elements, sources, determi-
nants, processes, and principles that had been advanced for 
curriculum development and evaluation by leading experimen-
talists during the first half of the 20th century, (p. 54) 
In spite of a factual dominance of this technological-
rational model, there still remain other views which, be it in 
many varied ways, belong to the Bildung-tradition. When one 
searches for such views, the work of the American philoso-
pher and pedagogue John Dewey (1859-1952) cannot be 
overlooked. Positively stated, a reconceptualization of 
curriculum will most certainly have to take its cue from this 
versatile thinker and doer. His work in philosophy and 
education is one great attempt to overcome dysfunctional 
dualisms like between the child and the curriculum, freedom 
and discipline, the individual and the society, body and mind. 
I will use my reconstruction of his theory of experience and 
learning to challenge the claim made by the Tanners (Tanner 
and Tanner, 1980, 1988; D. Tanner, 1982; L.N. Tanner, 1982) 
that Dewey must be regarded as the ancestor of 'modern' 
curriculum theory as formulated in the Tyler rationale.^ In 
the next part of my paper I will go into Dewey's attempt to 
reconceptualize the concept of experience as a way out of the 
dilemma of technology against Bildung. After that I will talk 
about Dewey's curriculum theory as a theory of 'planned 
experience.' 
Dewey's Theory of Experience 
The concept of experience is a central one in Dewey's 
overall position in the philosophy of education. Already early 
in his career, in 1892, Dewey's gives his perhaps most 
concise definition of experience: 'Our experience is simply 
what we do' (1892; LW17:154). The fact that there is experi-
ence and that there is a 'we' who experience, need not lead us 
to construct an ontological split-up between on the one hand 
experience, and on the other hand a 'we.' Dewey criticizes 
the fact that what he calls 'mobile distinctions' are made into 
rigid separations (idem, 156). Dewey's struggle with dual-
isms is evident in his critique of the reflex-arc concept in 
psychology (1896; EW5:96-110). To Dewey, experience is 
one of the core concepts of his pedagogical outlook, espe-
cially his curriculum theory (see a.o. 1902; MW2:271-291 
and 1897; EW5:84-95). In Democracy and Education (MW9) 
Dewey placed the emphasis on experience as the combina-
tion of trying and undergoing. The connection between 
education and experience is made in Dewey's effort to define 
education as the continuous reconstruction of experience (see 
1897; EW5:91; 1916; MW9:76; also see Archambault, 1966, 
115) a view that receives its most concise treatment in one of 
his last statements on public education (1938; LW13:l-62). 
In this text I will focus on Dewey's thoughts from a some-
what limited time perspective, namely his work around the 
turn of the century. 
There are three major, and in a sense, traditional prob-
lems that Dewey tries to solve by reconstructing the concept 
of experience. For each and every solution other thinkers have 
given, Dewey presents an alternative view. First of all Dewey 
criticizes those who break experience down into fragmented 
and atomized 'bits.' This becomes especially clear in Dewey's 
critique of the reflex-arc concept (1896; EW5:96-110). There 
Dewey criticizes contemporary psychological thought that 
burdens what Dewey perceives as continuous human 
conduct with artificial discontinuities. Dewey aims his 
critique especially at the separation construed by the adher-
ents of the reflex-arc theory, which on the one hand upholds 
an independent stimulus and on the other a dependent 
response. By making such a separation, psychologists neglect 
the wholeness and continuity in conduct. Thus, Dewey 
argues that the reflex-arc concept is inadequate to understand 
conduct as it is, namely a continually moving, dynamic 
affair. It is not the stimulus that constitutes the response, nor 
the response that constitutes the stimulus. It is the wholeness 
of the situation, or in Dewey's words, the 'co-ordination' 
between stimulus and response that determines what will be 
experienced by the individual as stimulus and response. 
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Dewey's conclusion makes the claim for a 'functionalistic' 
approach in psychology, namely that 
. . . the distinction of sensation and movement as stimulus and 
response respectively is not a distinction between what can be 
regarded as descriptive of anything which holds of psychical 
events or existences as such . . . [Stimulus and response] are 
strictly correlative and contemporaneous, (idem, 109) 
Stimulus and response are "inside a co-ordination and have 
their significance purely from the part played in maintaining 
or reconstituting the co-ordination" (idem, 99). Stimulus and 
response are not distinctions of existence, but functions in 
the continuation of conduct. They are a division of labor in 
order to achieve a certain end. Dewey proposes to see con-
duct as a continually moving process, the proper metaphor 
not being an arc but a circle. 
The second major problem, related to the first one, that 
Dewey tries to solve is the inadequacy of experience as an 
exclusively intellectualistic concept. In some theories, 
experience is seen primarily as a phenomenon of the 
intellect; that is of the 'mind' as an individualistic, 'higher' 
category for and by its own sake. Dewey attacks this claim 
on two points. First of all, and I think this is crucial from an 
educational point of view, he sees experience primarily as a 
down-to-earth and bodily affair. This point is also stressed in 
the reflex-arc critique. Dewey says that the conceptualization 
of 'sensation-followed-by-idea-followed-by movement' must 
be seen all the way round and must be replaced by that of a 
'sensori-motor-co-ordination' . . . 'the movement of body, 
head, and eye muscles determining the quality of what is 
experienced' (idem, 97). Dewey says that '(e)xperience is 
primarily an active-passive affair; it is not primarily cogni-
tive' (1916; MW9:140). Dewey demonstrates the many evils 
that result from the separation, or 'dualism' as he calls it, 
between mind and body (idem 141-144). First, bodily 
activity is suppressed and divorced from the acquisition of 
meaning. Anyone, I might add, who has ever observed an 
infant or a toddler exploring the world around him, knows 
the vital importance of the body. A second evil is that acting 
becomes isolated from meaning or purposes. And third, sepa-
ration of mind and body leads to an emphasis on things rather 
than on relations or connections. For Dewey, the human con-
dition is that humans exist as 'body-minds', a term ' . . . which 
designates what actually takes place when a living body is 
implicated in situations of discourse, communication, and 
participation' (1925; LW1:217). The second argument against 
a view of mind as an independent category is that in older 
theories 'mind' or 'cognition' is narrowed down to a 
one-sided rationalistic intellectualism. Dewey stresses 
throughout his work that there are many ways to experience, 
to learn and to know and that the intellect, be it a very 
important one, is only one of them. With Dewey, the case is 
for what I would like to call 'multiple rationality' and this 
again has important educational consequences. 
The third and last problem Dewey tries to solve has to 
do with the conceptualization of experience in relation to its 
status within human existence. For Dewey, experience is a 
'natural' phenomenon, not outside of the human species but 
completely inside of it as part of our evolutionary make-up. 
Experience denotes the way living organisms interact with 
their environment. For humans, the environment is social, 
cultural and political. Experience, although it goes on within 
and 'on' individuals and their bodies, is by no means an 
individualistic affair. It is mediated through culture, through 
the active engagement or participation in common undertak-
ings of the younger and older members of society. Experi-
ence then is something that in first instance follows from our 
being on an earth that must be 'known' in order to be inhab-
itable. This process of 'getting to know the earth' is a joint 
undertaking in which people's actions must be coordinated 
in order to reach this common goal. In this process, language 
becomes so important a tool that Dewey calls it 'the tool of 
tools' (cf Garrison, 1995, 721). Out of the coordination of 
conduct, in which linguistically something is 'made in 
common' (1938; LW12:52), meaning arises, and the 
communication of meaning (as a process of sharing and 
developing meaning) is at the heart of culture, and of 
education (cfBiesta, 1995). 
In Democracy and Education (1916; MW9) Dewey 
conceptualizes experience as a twofold affair, namely as 'an 
active and a passive element peculiarly combined' as he calls 
it (MW9:139), the active element being 'trying' and the pas-
sive being 'undergoing': 
When we experience something we act upon it, we do some-
thing with it; then we suffer or undergo the consequences. We 
do something to the thing and then it does something to us in 
return, (ibid) 
There is an intricate relationship between experience and 
learning as Dewey points out: 
To "learn from experience" is to make a backward and 
forward connection between what we do to things and what 
we enjoy or suffer from things in consequence. Under such 
conditions, doing becomes trying; an experiment with the world 
to find out what it is like; the undergoing becomes instruction 
-discovery of the connection of things, (idem, 140) 
Clearly, on this point Dewey makes the philosophical, the 
psychological and the educational conceptualizations of 
experience all fall in one line. This becomes even clearer when 
Dewey connects experience and learning to the concept of 
reflection. 'Thought or reflection . . . is the discernment of 
the relation between what we try to do and what happens in 
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consequence' (idem, 144). Here there are two types of expe-
rience, one being the well-known 'trial-and-error,' the other 
being the deliberate testing of a hypothesis, (in other words 
conducting an experiment). New insight is revealed and the 
experience undergoes what could be called a 'quality leap' 
and becomes reflective. When reflection becomes cultivated, 
experience, learning, and reflection pass over to thinking as 
the deliberate or "intentional endeavor to discover specific 
connections between something which we do and the conse-
quences which result, so that the two become continuous" 
(idem, 145). Reflection and thinking make planning possible, 
by the anticipation of certain outcomes or ends-in-view (idem, 
146). The function of thinking becomes apparent in situa-
tions where 'things are uncertain or doubtful or problematic' 
(idem, 148). Therefore, 
thinking is a process of inquiry, of looking into things, of 
investigating'. ( . . . ) (A)ll thinking is research, and all research 
is native, original, with him who carries it on, even if every-
body else in the world already is sure of what he is still looking 
for. (ibid) 
Thus, to Dewey, the child is an inventor before he is a 
consumer and a creator before he is an imitator, a philosophi-
cal statement with vast educational implications. The 
conclusion of thinking is called knowledge, which is a 
tentative result used in further action-planning (idem, 149). 
The above can be summarized by pointing at the central 
concepts within Dewey's theory of experience. They are 
functional coordination, cultural context and continuity in 
conduct. There we have, in a nutshell also the key concepts 
of Dewey's position in curriculum theory to which I will now 
devote my attention. 
Curriculum Theory: Dewey's 'Plan' 
Dewey says: 
Unless experience is so conceived that the result is a plan for 
deciding upon subject-matter, upon methods of instruction and 
discipline, and upon material equipment and social organiza-
tion of the school, it is wholly in the air. (1938; LW13:13) 
From the beginning of his career in education Dewey did not 
want to leave experience 'wholly in the air.' He had in mind 
a 'plan' of how to organize education. That is why I want to 
speak of Dewey's idea of curriculum as 'planned experience.' 
I will give the outlines of this plan by using the 1895 publica-
tion 'Plan of Organization of the University Primary School' 
(EW5:223-243) and some related publications. These show 
how around 1900 Dewey was testing his answer to what he 
felt was the problem of education in his laboratory school.^ 
I will show that with the concept of 'planned experience' 
Dewey creates a way out of the false dilemma between 
technology and 'Bildung.' The 'Plan' opens with a core state-
ment on education: "The ultimate problem of all education is 
to co-ordinate the psychological and the social factors" (idem, 
224). This means that in the center of the educational process 
is neither the development of the individual learner nor the 
adjustment to the demands of society; in the center is an ever 
renewed balancing of individuals (with their needs, demands, 
capacities, learning styles, and so on) and the society (a group 
of people with a certain socio-cultural and political make-
up). Dewey's 'Plan' consists of two connected steps. The first 
is to find an answer on a theoretical level to the problem of 
education (cf Baker, 1955). The second is have a course of 
inquiry emerge to test the hypothesis formulated on this prob-
lem. Both steps constitute a circular process of curriculum 
development that is guided by reflective intelligence, that 
constantly deals with changes in the environment. 
Step 1. The Problem of Education 
When Dewey says that the ultimate problem is to 
co-ordinate the psychological and social factors he means 
that experience is neither a purely individualistic affair nor a 
purely social one. Rather it is the interplay or coordination of 
individual and social factors that constitutes experience. 
Dewey makes it clear from the outset that the central 
problem in education is how to avoid an artificial antago-
nism between these aspects. On Dewey's view the problem 
of education ultimately is 'the harmonizing of individual traits 
with social ends and values' (Mayhew & Edwards, 1966,465), 
because both constitute the organic unity of individual and 
society which together form the 'conditions of education' 
(Archambault, 1966, 33). In education the individual and the 
social factors have to be coordinated, whereby 
[the] psychological requires that the individual have free use 
of all his personal powers; and . . . must be so individually 
studied as to have the laws of his own structure regarded. The 
sociological factor requires that the individual become 
acquainted with the social environment in which he lives, in 
all its important relations, and be disciplined to regard these 
relationships in his own activities. The co-ordination demands 
therefore, that the child be capable of expressing himself, but 
in such a way as to realize social ends. (1895; EW5:224) 
The individual and the society are organically connected: 
'Society is a society of individuals and the individual is 
always a social individual' (1897; EW5:55). On the individual 
side, we have the 'how' of conduct, on the social side we 
have what the individual does and needs to do from the stand-
point of the larger community of which it is a member. So the 
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educational process . . has two sides—one psychological 
and one sociological; . . . neither can be subordinated to the 
other or neglected without evil results following" (1897; 
EW5:85). The communities to which the child belongs, be it 
the neighborhood, the city, or the nation as a whole, are in 
constant change. Therefore, one must not expect education 
to focus exclusively on today's needs or whims. "It is an 
absolute impossibility to educate the child for any given 
station in life (1897; EW5:59). The school as a vital social 
institution should rather 'educate for change." 
It is worthwhile to quote Dewey at length now because 
of the subtle and well-balanced way he speaks about this 
complicated subject: 
I do not m e a n . . . that education does not centre in the pupil. It 
obviously takes its start with him and terminates in him. But 
the chi ld is not something isolated; he does not l ive 
inside himself, but in a world of nature and man. His experi-
ence is not complete in his impulses and emotions; these must 
reach out into a world of objects and persons. And until an 
experience has become relatively mature, the impulses do not 
even know what they are reaching out toward and for; they are 
blind and inchoate. To fail to assure them guidance and 
direction is not only to permit them to operate in a blind and 
spasmodic fashion, but it promotes the formation of habits of 
immature, undeveloped, and egoistic activity. Guidance and 
direction mean that the impulses and desires take effect through 
material that is impersonal and objective. And this subject 
matter can be provided in a way which will obtain ordered and 
consecutive development of experience only by means of the 
thoughtful selection and organization of material by those 
having the broadest experience -those who treat impulses and 
inchoate desires and plans as potentialities of growth through 
interaction and not as finalities. (1930; LW5:321) 
In Dewey's view, education is a matter of finding a balance 
between freedom and control, and between the child as an 
individual and as a social being. This involves an element of 
guidance and giving direction to the process of growth. 
When Dewey says: "I believe that education . . . is a 
process of living and not a preparation for future living" (1897; 
EW5:87) he hits one of the most disputed subjects in the philo-
sophical-educational field: the goal of education. Dewey takes 
the 'strong' position that: " . . . the educational process has no 
end beyond itself; it is its own end" (1916; MW9:50). 
"Education" and "life" are one and the same thing. This 
expresses itself in growth: "the cumulative movement of 
action toward a later result" (idem, 41). The individual, who 
lives in an environment that appeals to its innate powers uses 
the environmental conditions to get better adjusted to the ever 
more complex demands of that environment. At the same time 
that environment is constantly reshaped by the coordinated 
actions of the individuals. 
Step 2. Planning Experience: Structure and Emergence^ 
As the long quotation above shows, Dewey is by no 
means an advocate of unrestrained liberty. He is not a child-
centered pedagogue, no matter what his adversaries have made 
of his ideas. On the other hand the quotation makes clear that 
Dewey is neither a subject or teacher-centered pedagogue. 
The first step in the development of any curriculum is not 
located in the formulation of goals (outside the educational 
process itself) but an analysis of exactly the relation between 
child and subjects. Dewey begins with the identification of 
the starting point of the educational process; it is located in 
the child: 
The starting point is always the impulse to self-expression (and) 
(t)he educational process is to supply the material and provide 
the conditions so that the expression shall occur in its normal 
social direction. (1895; EW5:229) 
Then a connection is made between the child's impulses and 
experiences with what through a process of thousands of years 
of cultural evolution has been handed down to us: 
Consequently the beginning is made with the child's expres-
sive activities in dealing with the fundamental social materials 
—housing . . . clothing . . . food, (idem, 230) 
These "occupations" (a term borrowed from Froebel; cf 
Berding, in press A) are the fundamental ways in which people 
have kept themselves alive as they give opportunity to 
constructive work for the child of today, in relation to 'the 
most important activities of the everyday outside world' 
(1899; MW1:62). Dewey (idem, 92) describes 'occupation' 
as "a mode of activity on the part of the child which repro-
duces, or runs parallel to, some form of work carried on in 
social life." With the occupations as the nucleus, other 
activities (and all the 'traditional' subjects) in the school fall 
into their proper place: geography, history, science, and the 
3R's are derived from them and are placed in a certain 'func-
tional' relationship to them.^ The structure of the curriculum 
then is made up of four major parts: house-keeping, 
wood-work, foods, and clothing (cf Mayhew and Edwards, 
1996U936; cf Hendley, 1986; Westbrook, 1991). 
Now, the idea that Dewey uses the analysis of the 
problem of education as a means to select from an existing 
reservoir of knowledge those parts that solve the problem 
best is a false way to picture his point of view. In fact there is 
no 'reservoir' as such. This is precisely the point where Dewey 
breaks with technological approaches to curriculum. The fact 
that Dewey uses labels like 'history' or 'geography' might 
suggest that in spite of his criticism of traditional education 
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he still uses the old subjects. This however is not the case. 
Dewey is skeptical of logical considerations with regard to 
studies and subjects. To him psychological considerations 
come first as we have seen. 'Contents' or subjects as such do 
not exist, or perhaps better put, do not exist as 'given.' Dewey 
is clear about the point that 
. . . only as we ask what kind of experience is going on, what 
attitude some individual is actually assuming, what purpose or 
end some individual has in view, do we find a basis for select-
ing and arranging the facts under the label of any particular 
study. (1897; EW5:169) 
Because, as Dewey says, "(t)he true centre of correlation of 
the school subjects is not science, nor literature, nor history, 
nor geography, but the child's own social activities" (1897; 
EW5:89). The curriculum is not put before those activities, 
but emerges out of them. But they are not left to themselves. 
They are guided towards goals that are socially desirable. In 
order to achieve this, a certain structure is required; a struc-
ture that is not externally imposed upon the pupils. It is out of 
deep sense of confidence in the potentialities and capacities 
of learners that Dewey has this structure and discipline emerge 
out of the activities themselves.^ The control is inside the 
process not outside of it. Freedom and control are not 
opposed. Subject matter need not be 'sugar coated' (in order 
to be 'swallowed' by the pupils), but is 'psychologized' (1902; 
MW2:286), which means translated into the immediate and 
personal experience in which its original meaning is located. 
Main Points and Conclusions 
In Dewey's theory, what goes on as 'curriculum' (cf Doll, 
1995 who speaks of 'currere' to emphasize the practical-
active character) is characterized by the functional coordina-
tion of individual and social factors, which means that the 
child and traditions are not put over against each other but 
have a common denominator in the concept of experience. In 
this sense traditions are 'the accumulated experience of the 
race,' and it becomes the school's business to bring 'the child 
to share in the inherited sources of the race' (1897; EW5:87). 
In education, not transmission and control but sharing is the 
key word. 
Experiencing and learning are activities that affect 
individuals (especially in and 'on' their bodies) but they are 
socially mediated by the educator's invitation to the pupil to 
participate in communal undertakings and projects. In this 
process experiences are connected like an eternal chain. When 
an experience enables the child to better control and guide 
his "body-mental" activities towards desired ends, there is 
continuity in conduct and we might call this growth. Again, 
in education not transmission and control but invitation is 
the key word. 
Experiencing and learning take place in socio-cultural 
and political contexts. Although the school is part of a larger 
educative field, it is still vitally important. The school should 
be aware of the societal changes that take place and that have 
a profound influence on the preconditions of education, 
especially public education. A school can be a place of 
practice where there is real participation along with an 
emphasis on interactions and communication between indi-
viduals and groups on all levels . We might call this 
democracy. Schools have a distinctive function [because the 
school is a 'special environment' (1916; MW9:18-22)] to 
provide the learners with the means to intelligently go about 
their ways. A school curriculum should be so (re)constructed 
to serve this purpose. Again, not transmission and control 
but participation is the educational key word. 
And so we arrive at a final statement of Dewey's that 
there is no antagonism between the child and the curriculum. 
Rather the child and the curriculum are 'two limits which 
define a single process (1902; MW2:278). It is the concept 
of experience that makes them stick together. 
Dewey's curriculum theory is founded upon anthropo-
logical, psychological and social-philosophical (political) 
views that conceptualize the nature of 'child' as an active 
organism in search of stimuli that will promote its growth. 
The experiential nature of learning as problem solving and 
the political nature of schooling as embedded in community 
structures maximize active participation in learning (cf 
Berding, in press B). 
With Dewey we are not held prisoner by either the tech-
nological or the Bildung approach. Dewey is most critical of 
technology in the way it has monopolized rationality and has 
put method before experience, and has split up things that 
belong together, like means and ends. But nevertheless Dewey 
knows that forms of technology are needed. It's the way 
society deals with this that counts. On the other hand, Dewey 
corrects the Bildung-trad\t\on on a certain blindness for 
societal developments that have a great impact on education, 
like technological developments. With Dewey we have 
educational theory in its utmost political sense: the shaping 
of a society in which the common goods, among which are 
knowledge and social intelligence, are distributed fairly 
among all who participate in that society. In that process 
different forms of technology and planning are demanded so 
that it can be controlled and guided toward desired ends. 
Lastly, Dewey stands quite alone in his conceptualization 
of curriculum as non-teleological , non-technological , 
guiding, and experiential (cf Doll, 1995). Nevertheless his 
position can be fruitful for the movement toward a more 
f lexible curriculum if we are wi l l ing to conce ive of 
education as a process of communication, participation, 
dialogue and sharing. 
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Notes 
1. This text is a slightly edited version of a paper presented 
under the same title at the international conference 
'Problems of Education at the End of the 20th Century: 
International Dialogue.' Kursk, Russia, April 8-13,1996. 
2. Elsewhere I have reconstructed Dewey's critique of 
philosophies of education such as Herbart's in which the 
child is seen as a passive receiver of what I call 'coagu-
lated culture' (Berding, 1991). According to Dewey, '(t)he 
child is not waiting passively to take in experience. He 
is looking for experiences, and in every moment of his 
waking life, he shows this original and spontaneous 
eagerness to get more experience, and become acquainted 
with the world of things and of people about him' 
(Educational Lectures before Brigham Young Academy: 
1901; LW 17:215). 
3. This is the main thesis of the Tanners, and also the 
subject of an exchange between them, Jickling (1988) 
and others. Also see Kliebard (1995) versus Hlebowitsh 
(1995), and Berding (1992). 
4. As Dewey's laboratory school had two 'main purposes: 
(1) to exhibit, test, verify, and criticize theoretical 
statements and principles; and (2) to add to the sum of 
facts and principles in its special line' (Mayhew and 
Edwards, 1966,3). 
The central problem outlined above diverged into four 
sub-problems (The School and Society: 1899; MW1:59-
61). They were: 
a. What can be done, and how can it be done, to bring 
the school into closer relation with the home and 
neighbourhood life . . .? 
b. What can be done in the way of introducing subject-
matter in history and science and art, that shall have 
a positive value and real significance in the child's 
own life . . . ? 
c. How can instruction in (the) formal, symbolic 
branches—the mastering of the ability to read, write, 
and use figures intelligently—be carried on with 
everyday experience and occupations as their back-
ground and in definite relations to other studies of 
more inherent content, and be carried on in such a 
way that the child shall feel their necessity through 
their connection with subjects which appeal to him 
on their own account? 
d. Individual attention. 
Although with some reluctance, Dewey accepted the 
label of an 'experimental school,' because "(w)e have 
attempted to find out by trying, by doing . . . whether 
these problems may be worked out, and how they may 
be worked out" (idem, 61). 
5. The term 'emergent curriculum' is inspired by Doll 
(1995). 
6. This way of 'co-ordinating' the different school subjects 
means an emancipation from the Herbartian position that 
placed history and literature at the core of the curricu-
lum (cf Berding, 1991). It also meant a radical departure 
from practices which displayed an atmosphere of 
'sit-stilleries' and drudgery (see Rice, 1893). 
7. From this point of view Dewey's ideas and practices very 
much resemble those of the Polish pedagogue, writer and 
doctor Janusz Korczak, whose 'pedagogy of respect' (cf 
Berding, 1994, 1995) knows this same sensitivity for the 
daily 'life and strife' of children. 
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